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输配电装备及系统安全与新技术国家重点实验室(重庆大学),重庆市 400044
伏坚(1995—),男,硕士研究生,主要研究方向:电力系统规划与可靠性。E-mail:fujian@cqu.edu.cn
胡博(1983—),男,通信作者,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要研究方向:电力系统规划与可靠性、电力系统分析、并行计算。E-mail:hboy8361@163.com
谢开贵(1972—),男,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要研究方向:电力系统规划与可靠性、电力系统优化运行。E-mail:kaiguixie@vip.163.com
收稿日期:2020-05-07,
修回日期:2020-08-15,
网络出版日期:2020-11-11,
纸质出版日期:2021-01-25
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伏坚,胡博,谢开贵等.应对协同攻击的电力系统发输电拓展随机规划[J].电力系统自动化,2021,45(2):21-29.
FU Jian,HU Bo,XIE Kaigui,et al.Stochastic Planning of Generation and Transmission Expansion for Power System Against Coordinated Attacks[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2021,45(2):21-29.
伏坚,胡博,谢开贵等.应对协同攻击的电力系统发输电拓展随机规划[J].电力系统自动化,2021,45(2):21-29. DOI: 10.7500/AEPS20200507001.
FU Jian,HU Bo,XIE Kaigui,et al.Stochastic Planning of Generation and Transmission Expansion for Power System Against Coordinated Attacks[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2021,45(2):21-29. DOI: 10.7500/AEPS20200507001.
随着能源互联网和智能电网的大力发展,中国电力系统已经发展成为一个复杂的信息物理系统,其遭受各种恶意攻击的风险大幅增加。为了保证电力系统的安全可靠运行,对各类恶意攻击进行建模并提出针对性的防御措施具有重要的现实意义。文中针对信息物理协同攻击提出了一个防御性随机规划模型,模型以攻击导致的削负荷期望量最小为目标函数,考虑多种协同攻击方案的影响,通过优化新增机组和线路达到防御攻击的目的。在建模过程中,首先在攻击人员的角度建立了协同攻击模型,并提出了协同攻击场景生成方法。然后,基于所生成的协同攻击场景提出了应对攻击的电力系统随机规划模型,并考虑了遭受攻击后运行人员以及规划人员视角下规划系统的运行情况。最后,基于改进IEEE RTS-79系统进行了算例分析,验证了所提模型的正确性和有效性。
With the development of Energy Internet and smart grid
the power system in China has developed into a complex cyber-physical system
and the risk of various malicious attacks increases greatly. In order to ensure safe and reliable operation of the power system
it is of great practical significance to model all kinds of malicious attacks and propose corresponding defense measures. In this paper
a defensive stochastic planning model is proposed according to coordinated cyber-physical attacks. The objective function of the model is to minimize the expected load shedding caused by attacks. The purpose of defense attacks is achieved by optimizing candidate generators and lines considering the impact of various coordinated attack schemes. First
the coordinated attack model is established from the perspective of attackers in modelling
and the method of generating coordinated attack scenarios is proposed. Then
based on the generated coordinated attack scenarios
a stochastic planning model of the power system is proposed to defend the attacks
and the operation situations of the planning system from perspectives of operators and planners are both considered after the attack. Finally
case studies on a modified IEEE RTS-79 system are performed to show the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed model.
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