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1.广东电网有限责任公司运营监控中心,广东省广州市510080
2.广东电网有限责任公司电网规划研究中心,广东省广州市510080
3.新能源电力系统国家重点实验室(华北电力大学),北京市102206
赵双(1989—),男,硕士,工程师,主要研究方向:电力系统分析与控制、碳排放权交易。E-mail:mrshuangzh@163.com
潘险险(1989—),女,通信作者,硕士,工程师,主要研究方向:电力系统分析与控制、碳排放权交易。E-mail:panxianxianpxx@163.com
林俐(1968—),女,博士,副教授,主要研究方向:电力系统分析与控制、碳排放权交易。E-mail:linli@ncepu.edu.cn
收稿日期:2019-12-19,
修回日期:2020-06-01,
网络出版日期:2020-07-22,
纸质出版日期:2020-08-25
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赵双,潘险险,林俐.碳排放配额托管业务中联合系统交易决策及利润分配策略[J].电力系统自动化,2020,44(16):30-36.
ZHAO Shuang,PAN Xianxian,LIN Li.Trading Decision and Profit Distribution Strategy of Joint System in Carbon Emission Quota Custody Business[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2020,44(16):30-36.
赵双,潘险险,林俐.碳排放配额托管业务中联合系统交易决策及利润分配策略[J].电力系统自动化,2020,44(16):30-36. DOI: 10.7500/AEPS20191219001.
ZHAO Shuang,PAN Xianxian,LIN Li.Trading Decision and Profit Distribution Strategy of Joint System in Carbon Emission Quota Custody Business[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2020,44(16):30-36. DOI: 10.7500/AEPS20191219001.
碳交易机制下的碳排放权从边际减排成本低的企业流向边际减排成本高的企业,实现资源的优化配置,是一种基于市场调节机制实现环境保护的经济手段。碳排放配额托管业务是碳市场中一种新型的碳配额管理业务模式,针对碳排放配额托管业务中1个控排企业与2个托管机构联合系统的协调问题,建立了联合系统交易模型,研究了联合系统非合作博弈、三方共同合作博弈以及控排企业与托管机构合作博弈情景下的最优行为决策。然后,从主体要素贡献理论的视角,提出合作博弈产生的利润增加额的优化分配方法。分析结果表明,系统总利润从大到小排序为:三方共同合作、控排企业与管理成本较低的托管机构合作、控排企业与管理成本较高的托管机构合作、三方均不合作。
Under the carbon trading mechanism
the carbon emission rights flow from enterprises with low marginal emission-reduction costs to those with high marginal emission-reduction costs, which achieves the optimal allocation of resources
and it is an economic measure based on market regulation mechanism to achieve environmental protection. The carbon emission quota custody business is a new business mode of carbon quota management in the carbon market. To solve the coordination problems of the joint system with one emission control company and two custody agencies in the carbon emission quota custody business
a trading model of joint system is established
and the optimal behavior decision of the joint system is studied in the situations of the non-cooperative game
tripartite cooperative game and cooperative game between the emission control company and the custody agencies. Then
from the perspective of the contribution theory of subjective factors
an optimal distribution method of profits increase from cooperative games is proposed. The analysis results show that the total profits of the system ranking from the highest to the lowest are as follows: tripartite cooperation
cooperation between the emission control company and the custody agency with lower management costs
cooperation between the emission control company and the custody agency with higher management costs
and no cooperation among the three parties.
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