目标级联分析法在完全竞争发电市场迭代竞价机制中的应用

谢敏; 胡昕彤; 刘明波

doi:10.7500/AEPS20190304008

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目标级联分析法在完全竞争发电市场迭代竞价机制中的应用

学术研究 | 更新时间：2020-07-14

- 目标级联分析法在完全竞争发电市场迭代竞价机制中的应用
- Application of Analytical Target Cascading in Iterative Bidding Mechanism of Complete Competitive Power Generation Market
- 电力系统自动化-方正平台 2020年第6期页码：106-112
- 作者机构：
  
  1. 华南理工大学电力学院，广东省广州市 510640
  2. 中国南方电网广东电网广州供电局，广东省广州市 510600
- 作者简介：
  
  谢敏(1978—)，女，博士，副教授，主要研究方向：电力系统优化运行与控制。E-mail：minxie@scut.edu.cn
  胡昕彤(1994—)，女，通信作者，硕士研究生，主要研究方向：电力系统优化运行与控制。E-mail：894685795@qq.com
  刘明波(1964—)，男，博士，教授，主要研究方向：电力系统优化运行与控制。E-mail：epmbliu@scut.edu.cn
- 基金信息：
  
  广东省自然科学基金自由申请项目(2018A0303130134)
- DOI：10.7500/AEPS20190304008
  中图分类号：
- 收稿日期：2019-03-04，
  
  修回日期：2019-08-17，
  
  网络出版日期：2020-02-18，
  
  纸质出版日期：2020-03-25
- 稿件说明：
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谢敏,胡昕彤,刘明波.目标级联分析法在完全竞争发电市场迭代竞价机制中的应用[J].电力系统自动化,2020,44(06):106-112.

XIE Min,HU Xintong,LIU Mingbo.Application of Analytical Target Cascading in Iterative Bidding Mechanism of Complete Competitive Power Generation Market[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2020,44(06):106-112.
谢敏,胡昕彤,刘明波.目标级联分析法在完全竞争发电市场迭代竞价机制中的应用[J].电力系统自动化,2020,44(06):106-112. DOI： 10.7500/AEPS20190304008.

XIE Min,HU Xintong,LIU Mingbo.Application of Analytical Target Cascading in Iterative Bidding Mechanism of Complete Competitive Power Generation Market[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2020,44(06):106-112. DOI： 10.7500/AEPS20190304008.

摘要

采用迭代竞价机制可以促进发电商经济、合理地上报电价和组织生产，同时能赋予购买者议价的能力，促使电力市场协调、高效地运作。但现有的迭代竞价方法主要采用按报价支付或按统一边际出清价进行结算的方式，很少采用按节点边际电价进行结算，并且可能出现迭代次数过多而难以应用的情况。为此，提出了一种基于目标级联分析理论的发电市场迭代竞价模型。将发电商与独立系统运营商作为不同的利益主体，分别以生产效益最优和购电成本最小为目标，通过发电功率进行联络以实现2个优化模型的解耦与并行求解。该模型考虑了网络约束的影响，能有效激励发电商上报其真实成本，有利于社会资源的优化配置。基于IEEE 39节点系统和IEEE 118节点系统的算例表明，目标级联分析法应用于完全竞争的发电市场迭代竞价机制可行，且收敛性和计算效率都能满足要求。

Abstract

Iterative bidding mechanism can promote power generators to quote electricity price economically and rationally and organize production. It can also give purchasers the ability to negotiate

and promote the coordinated and efficient operation of the power market. However

current iterative bidding methods mainly settle accounts according to the quoted price or the uniform marginal clearing price

but seldom according to the locational marginal price of nodes. There may be also too many iterations to be applied. Therefore

an iterative bidding model for power market based on analytical target cascading theory is proposed. Power generators and independent system operators are regarded as different stakeholders

and their objectives are optimizing the production efficiency and minimizing the cost of purchasing electricity

respectively. Coupling and parallel solution of the two optimized models are realized by connecting through generation power. Considering the influence of network constraints

the model can effectively motivate generators to report their real costs and is conducive to the optimal allocation of social resources. Examples of IEEE 39-bus system and IEEE 118-bus system show that analytical target cascading can be applied to the iterative bidding mechanism of fully competitive power generation market

and the convergence and computational efficiency can meet the requirements.

关键词

Keywords

references

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