Mechanism Design of Capacity Payment for Incentivizing Flexibility of Thermal Power

Zhaoyuan WU; Ming ZHOU; Jianxiao WANG; Qing XIA; Gengyin LI

doi:10.7500/AEPS20200626001

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Mechanism Design of Capacity Payment for Incentivizing Flexibility of Thermal Power

Special Topic on Key Technologies for Construction and Operation of Electricity Spot Market | 更新时间：2025-06-16

- Mechanism Design of Capacity Payment for Incentivizing Flexibility of Thermal Power
- Automation of Electric Power Systems Vol. 45, Issue 6, Pages: 43-51(2021)
- 作者机构：
  
  1.新能源电力系统国家重点实验室，华北电力大学，北京市 102206
  2.电力系统及大型发电设备安全控制和仿真国家重点实验室，清华大学，北京市 100084
- 作者简介：
- 基金信息：
  
  National Natural Science Foundation of China;State Grid Corporation of China
- DOI：10.7500/AEPS20200626001
  CLC：
- Received：26 June 2020，
  
  Revised：2020-11-11，
  
  Published Online：31 December 2020，
  
  Published：25 March 2021
- 稿件说明：
移动端阅览
武昭原,周明,王剑晓等.激励火电提供灵活性的容量补偿机制设计[J].电力系统自动化,2021,45(6):43-51.

WU Zhaoyuan,ZHOU Ming,WANG Jianxiao,et al.Mechanism Design of Capacity Payment for Incentivizing Flexibility of Thermal Power[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2021,45(6):43-51.
武昭原,周明,王剑晓等.激励火电提供灵活性的容量补偿机制设计[J].电力系统自动化,2021,45(6):43-51. DOI： 10.7500/AEPS20200626001.

WU Zhaoyuan,ZHOU Ming,WANG Jianxiao,et al.Mechanism Design of Capacity Payment for Incentivizing Flexibility of Thermal Power[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2021,45(6):43-51. DOI： 10.7500/AEPS20200626001.

摘要

近年来，在中国电力系统低碳化转型以及电力市场化改革快速推进的同时也暴露了一些问题，其中较为典型的就是以煤电为代表的火电企业普遍大面积亏损，甚至濒临破产清算的困境，这一现象主要归因于大规模新能源零边际成本占据火力发电份额，以及火电提供灵活性以保障新能源消纳产生的外部成本没有得到充分回报，部分火电企业甚至还贷难以为继

亟须建立合理的容量机制保障火电这部分外部成本的回收。因此，文中首先对比了国内外主流的容量补偿机制及其对中国的适应性。然后建立了考虑火电企业退出市场的双层决策模型，分析了不同可再生能源渗透率下，容量补偿价格对火电企业决策以及市场运行的影响，包括出清电价、辅助服务成本等。最后，通过IEEE 30节点系统和中国某省级实际电网，验证了所提模型的有效性。算例结果表明，制定合理的容量补偿机制能够有效保证火电企业收益，并激励其提供灵活性，从而提升电网整体经济性和运行效率。

Abstract

In recent years

low-carbon transition of power systems and rapid promotion of electricity market-oriented reform in China have exposed some problems

typical one of which is that the thermal power enterprises

represented by coal-fired power

are generally suffering from large-scale losses

or even face the dilemma of bankruptcy and liquidation. This phenomenon is mainly caused by the large-scale renewable energy with zero marginal cost occupying the share of thermal power generation. At the same time

thermal power provides flexibility to ensure that the external costs generated by renewable energy consumption is not fully rewarded

and even some thermal power enterprises cannot continue to repay loans. As a result

it is urgent to establish a reasonable capacity payment mechanism to guarantee the recovery of external costs of thermal power units. Therefore

the current mainstream capacity payment mechanisms and their adaptability in China are firstly compared. Then

a bi-level programming model considering the phaseout of thermal power enterprises is proposed

and the influences of capacity payment prices on the decision-making and market operation of thermal power enterprises with different renewable energy penetration rates are analyzed

including the market clearing price and auxiliary service cost. Finally

case studies based on the IEEE 30-bus system and an actual provincial power grid validate the effectiveness of the proposed model. The results show that a reasonable capacity payment mechanism can effectively guarantee the income of thermal power enterprises

and encourage them to provide flexible services

so as to improve the overall economy and operation efficiency of the power system.

关键词

Keywords

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