Stackelberg Game Based Incentive Pricing Mechanism of Demand Response for Power Grid Corporations

Guoying LIN; Shixiang LU; Kunjian GUO; Ciwei GAO; Xiaofeng FENG

doi:10.7500/AEPS20190613004

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Stackelberg Game Based Incentive Pricing Mechanism of Demand Response for Power Grid Corporations

Basic Research | 更新时间：2025-06-16

- Stackelberg Game Based Incentive Pricing Mechanism of Demand Response for Power Grid Corporations
- Automation of Electric Power Systems Vol. 44, Issue 10, Pages: 59-67(2020)
- 作者机构：
  
  1.广东电网有限责任公司计量中心，广东省广州市 510080
  2.浙江大学电气工程学院，浙江省杭州市 310027
  3.东南大学电气工程学院，江苏省南京市 210096
- 作者简介：
- 基金信息：
  
  Abstract:
  Demand response is an important tool for the electricity retailer to manage risk in spot market. However, in previous studies, electricity retailers mostly adopt price-based demand response strategies, which cannot flexibly implement demand response according to the changing practical situation. The incentive-based demand response is lack of in-depth research. In this paper, a Stackelberg game model for the incentive-based demand response between a single electricity retailer and multiple users is established. In this model, the electricity retailer reduces the loss of electricity sales by formulating demand response subsidy strategies during the periods when the electricity price in spot market is higher than its selling price. In the corresponding period, users decide the response electricity quantity according to the subsidy price set by the electricity retailer to obtain additional profits. Moreover, the solution of game equilibrium is presented by analysis. A case study shows that electricity retailer and users can all benefit from the demand response. In addition, the influence of price fluctuations in spot market on the subsidy price of the electricity retailer, response electricity quantity of users and respective profits of each participant, as well as the impact of various users joining in demand response projects on the profits of the electricity retailer are analyzed.
  Foundation:This work is supported by China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd
- DOI：10.7500/AEPS20190613004
  CLC：
- Received：13 June 2019，
  
  Revised：2019-10-09，
  
  Published Online：21 February 2020，
  
  Published：25 May 2020
- 稿件说明：
移动端阅览
林国营,卢世祥,郭昆健等.基于主从博弈的电网公司需求响应补贴定价机制[J].电力系统自动化,2020,44(10):59-67.

LIN Guoying,LU Shixiang,GUO Kunjian,et al.Stackelberg Game Based Incentive Pricing Mechanism of Demand Response for Power Grid Corporations[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2020,44(10):59-67.
林国营,卢世祥,郭昆健等.基于主从博弈的电网公司需求响应补贴定价机制[J].电力系统自动化,2020,44(10):59-67. DOI： 10.7500/AEPS20190613004.

LIN Guoying,LU Shixiang,GUO Kunjian,et al.Stackelberg Game Based Incentive Pricing Mechanism of Demand Response for Power Grid Corporations[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2020,44(10):59-67. DOI： 10.7500/AEPS20190613004.

摘要

文中构建了电网公司与多个用户的需求响应主从博弈模型。其中电网公司基于预测得到的下一年负荷持续曲线，选取合适时间段制定需求响应补贴策略，通过降低峰值负荷减少输配电建设成本，提高输配电整体收益；而用户根据电网公司在某时段制定的需求响应补贴价格决定在该时段的响应量来获取额外收益。文中对主从博弈模型的存在性及求解思路进行了分析，并给出了博弈均衡解的求解流程。算例表明，电网公司可基于所构建模型得到峰荷时段的补贴价格，且电网公司及用户均可通过需求响应而获益。此外算例还分析了可避免输配电容量单位成本变化对电网公司需求响应收益的影响。

Abstract

A Stackelberg game model between a power grid corporation and multiple users is constructed for demand response. The power grid corporation selects the appropriate time period to formulate the subsidy strategy of demand response based on the predicted load duration curve of next year. The construction costs of power transmission and distribution are decreased by reducing the peak load

thereby the overall revenue of power transmission and distribution is improved. Users choose the response in electricity consumption based on the subsidy price of demand response during the time period set by the power grid corporation to obtain additional profits. Moreover

the existence of the Stackelberg game model and the idea for solving the model are analyzed

and the process of solving the game equilibrium solution is presented. Case study shows that the power grid corporation can declares subsidized price during peak load period based on the developed model. Both the power grid corporation and users can benefit from demand response. In addition

the impact of the unit cost change of avoidable power transmission and distribution capacity on profits of demand response for the power grid corporation is analyzed.

关键词

Keywords

references

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