Automation of Electric Power SystemsVol. 40, Issue 3, Pages: 52-58(2016)
作者机构:
浙江大学电气工程学院,浙江省,杭州市,310027
作者简介:
基金信息:
DOI:
CLC:
Published:2016
稿件说明:
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MEI Tianhua. [J]. Automation of electric power systems, 2016, 40(3): 52-58.
DOI:
MEI Tianhua. [J]. Automation of electric power systems, 2016, 40(3): 52-58.DOI:
考虑历史排放赤字的电力初始碳排放权公理化公平分配方法
摘要
公平性是电力碳排放权无偿分配的首要问题
而如何考虑历史排放赤字的影响往往是分配是否公平的焦点之一。为此
建立了基于Shapley值的历史排放赤字分摊模型
解决了历史排放赤字在减排年份的分摊问题
并对分配模型进行了公理化处理。根据“谁引起、谁负责”的原则
建立了历史排放赤字在各机组间的分摊模型
解决了历史排放赤字对不同机组排放求偿权的削减问题。进一步地
通过分配方法的一致性约束
建立了考虑历史排放赤字的初始碳排放权分配模型。此外
通过对自主参与分配机制下博弈行为的研究
证明了博弈均衡的存在性
并给出了考虑历史排放赤字分配模型的匿名性、有效性和单位选择无关性的证明
对公平排序性进行了讨论。最后
通过电力碳排放权分配的算例表明
所提方法可满足公平分配的基本要求
且易为各方所接受。
Abstract
Equity is one of the foremost considerations in free allocation of power system carbon emission
while the impact of historical deficits is one of the key essentials in fair distribution. Based on Shapley values
a historical deficit sharing model capable of solving the allocation problem of historical deficits in the emission reduction year is established and axiomatized. In accordance with the principle that whoever causes the issue should be responsible for it
a historical emission deficit sharing model among the units is developed
which is capable of solving the reduction of unit's claims caused by historical deficits. On this basis
with the consistency constraint of the allocation method taken into account
an allocation model for initial emission allowances considering the historical emission deficit is established. Furthermore
the participants' gaming behaviors under the aggregation mechanism are studied
which proved the existence of game equilibrium. In the meantime
the properties of the historical emission deficits sharing model such as anonymity
efficiency and independence of irrelevant share are proved
and the fair ranking is discussed. In the end
it is proved by a case study that as the proposed method meets the basic requirements for fair allocation